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Calculation of Child Support
in Pennsylvania
I. Introduction
State statutes have traditionally granted wide discretion to trial court
judges and domestic relations officers in child support award determina-
tions. Pennsylvania statutes call for the judicial officer to set an amount
that is either reasonable and proper,
I or in line with equitable demands,
2
or at such a rate as the court may direct. 3 This vague language has led to a
great deal of litigation. Rules determining the procedure to be used in
calculating child support have slowly evolved through the case law to the
point that there are now several widely accepted basic propositions;
these, however, are often embodied in vague and minimum standards.4
Pennsylvania courts appear reluctant to follow a consistent pattern of
factor analysis. A factor considered of great significance in one county
may be given little weight in another and even the method of calculation
differs from one county to the next.
The purpose of this comment is to explore the criteria, both dis-
cretionary and statutory, that judges apply in making a support calcula-
tion.5 The main factors that will be discussed are the needs of the child,
the ability of the parents to pay, the living expenses of the parents, the
equalization of the support burden between mother and father in light of
the Pennsylvania equal rights amendment, 6 the income of the child, and
former agreements between the parents. The lack of any statutory limita-
tion on the amount of the support order further emphasizes the tremen-
dous role that judicial discretion plays in the consideration of the above
factors.7 It should be noted at the outset that the support order is never
final. It may be increased or decreased upon reargument before the court
when there is a change in circumstances, financial or otherwise.
8
1. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4322(b) (Purdon 1973).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 131 (Purdon 1965).
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 1973 (Purdon 1968); 18 PA. CONS. STAT_ ANN. § 4323
(Purdon 1973).
4. S. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL 10 (1971).
5. This comment will not engage in a detailed statistical analysis but will critically
analyze concrete factors considered in support determinations. For a statistical discussion
of child support, see Annot., I A.L.R.3d 324 (1965); Annot., I A.L.R.3d 382 (1965).
6. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 28.
7. Commonwealth ex rel. Warner v. Warner, 198 Pa. Super. Ct. 124, 181 A.2d 888
(1962). Rarely, however, is the award greater than one-half of the non-custodial parent's net
pay. See Smith v. Smith, 52 Wash. 19 (Pa. C.P. 1970).
8. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 263 (Purdon 1962), which provides in part,
This comment will examine the weight that is given to each indi-
vidual consideration and whether it is consistent with support purposes
and theories. Arguments for inclusion or exclusion of particular consider-
ations will be offered, as well as suggestions to better organize child
support calculations and make this a more meaningful body of law.
II. Development of Support Determination Principles
A parental duty to support9 a minor child1" is imposed in every state
either by statute or under common law." This duty, 2 which arises from
the biological relation of parent and child, extends to illegitimate as well
as legitimate children. 13 Recently it has been expanded to include adopted
children as well.'
4
The Pennsylvania legislature has seen fit to establish the child's right
to support in numerous overlapping and redundant statutes,' 5 all but one
of which allow action only against the father. 16 In construing these
Any order heretofore or hereafter made by any court of this Commonwealth for
support of a wife, child or parent, may be altered, repealed, suspended, in-
creased, or amended, . . . as the case may warrant.
9. Child support has been defined as "the periodic payment of sums of money for the
support of a child running for an indeterminate period. ... Greene v. Greene, 71 Misc.
2d 708, 709, 336 N.Y.S.2d 560, 562 (1972).
10. In Pennsylvania the age of majority is now eighteen for litigational purposes, PA.
R. Civ. P. 76 (1975), but remains twenty-one for support purposes.
11. Goodman, Oberman, & Wheat, Rights and Obligations of Child Support, 7 Sw.
U.L. REV. 36 (1975).
12. This obligation has been termed an absolute duty. Commonwealth ex rel. Mickey
v. Mickey, 220 Pa. Super. Ct. 39, 280 A.2d 417 (1971); Commonwealth ex rel. Snively v.
Snively, 206 Pa. Super. Ct. 278, 212 A.2d 905 (1965).
13. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that a state statute allowing child
support for legitimate, but not for illegitimate, children violates the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
14. Commonwealth ex rel Borrow v. Borrow, 199 Pa. Super. Ct. 592, 185 A.2d 605
(1962). Although the court does not impart a duty on a stepparent to support a stepchild, the
court will recognize the child's right to receive support and the parent's right to provide it if
the parent so wishes. See notes 101-05 and accompanying text infra.
15. For a summary of statutes pertinent to child support in Pennsylvania, see W. SELL
& T. WHITE, 2 PENNSYLVANIA KEYSTONE, CHILD SUPPORT (1974).
16. Support statutes applying only to the husband were held constitutional in Norris v.
Norris, 63 Pa. D. & C.2d 239 (C.P. Phila. 1974).
The father may be ordered to support his child through a quasi-criminal or a civil action,
whereas only a civil action may be brought against the mother. The principles of support
calculation remain the same regardless of which action is sought.
The quasi-criminal actions are found at 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4322 (Purdon 1973)
(allows action for desertion or willful non-support to be brought by a minor under the age of
sixteen, or by his mother, against the father) and 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4323 (Purdon
1973) (permits illegitimate child to bring same type action against the father). In both
instances a support order and a criminal sanction may be issued, making this remedy the
most popular.
PA STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 131 (Purdon 1965), permits a civil action against the father. This
statute makes provision for child support (and wife support) when the father refuses to
provide maintenance without cause. Cases involving a combined award for wife and child
will also be discussed in this comment because the principles used to determine the amount
of the award are the same as in those solely awarding child support.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 1973 (Purdon 1968) also provides for a civil action and can be
used against both the mother and the father:
The husband, wife, child, . . . father, and mother of every indigent person,
. . . shall, if of sufficient financial ability, care for and maintain, or financially
statutes, Pennsylvania courts have often stated that the purpose of a
support order is to determine a reasonable allowance for the support of
children, keeping in mind the property and earning capacity of the parents
and the station in life of the parties. "7 This interpretation should have the
effect of giving the child's needs top priority. The parents' earnings and
their station in life should be secondary considerations used either to raise
the award above the level of the child's basic necessities or to lower it to
minimize the hardship on the low-income parent.
The determination of parental contribution is a complex matter
involving significant psychological, sociological, and economic effects
on all parties, particularly since it often must be made after a separation or
divorce. Even if the parents' income is adequate to meet the child's
needs, the court must determine precisely the amount of the non-custodial
parent's contribution. Additional problems arise when the non-custodial
parent, usually the father,18 is unable to comfortably support both himself
and his child and yet the custodial parent requires financial aid to care for
the child. Unfortunately, the division of the family into two economic
units often entails financial hardship. The best a court can hope to do in
many situations is to balance the hardship.'
9
Courts have usually tipped the scales in favor of the child whenever
possible and have required the parent to make personal sacrifices to
furnish the child with the basic needs of life.2" This policy has been lim-
ited, however, by the feeling that the support order should not be used
to punish the parent 2 ' or to confiscate his property.22 Unlimited awards
could stifle the parent's ambition to earn money for his own support 23 and
thereby thwart the court's chief objective, which is to protect and advance
the welfare of the child.
24
assist, such indigent person at such rate as the court of the county, where such
indigent person resides shall order or direct.
17. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Luongo v. Tillye, 229 Pa. Super. Ct. 453, 457, 323
A.2d 172, 173 (1974); Commonwealth ex rel. Larson v. Larson, 211 Pa. Super. Ct. 30, 34,
234 A.2d 18, 20 (1967).
18. Pennsylvania courts still follow the "tender years" doctrine, which dictates that,
all other factors being equal, the mother should be awarded custody of a child of tender
years. Commonwealth ex rel. Ackerman v. Ackerman, 204 Pa. Super. Ct. 403, 205 A.2d 49
(1964). For a case awarding the father custody see Commonwealth ex rel. Parikh v. Parikh,
449 Pa. 105, 296 A.2d 625 (1972). See generally, Comment, Pennsylvania Child Custody: The
Tender Years Doctrine-Reason or Excuse?, 81 DICK. L. REV. 775 (1977).
19. Sperry v. Sperry, 29 Som. 228 (Pa. C.P. 1974).
20. Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974); Commonwealth ex rel. Ulmer
v. Sommerville, 200 Pa. Super. Ct. 640, 190 A.2d 182 (1963).
A parent should be required to bear the hardship before the child because the parent is
usually most responsible for his own plight and has more control over his own situation.
This analysis applies equally to the non-custodial and custodial parent and to children of
both sexes.
21. E.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Platt v. Platt, 229 Pa. Super. Ct. 423, 323 A.2d 29
(1974); Doelp v. Doelp, 219 Pa. Super. Ct. 420, 281 A.2d 721 (1971).
22. Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974); Commonwealth ex rel.
Goichman v. Goichman, 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 311, 316 A.2d 653 (1973).
23. Commonwealth v. McNamara, 57 Schuyl. 168 (Pa. C.P. 1961).
24. Commonwealth ex rel. Kaplan v. Kaplan, 236 Pa. Super. Ct. 26, 344 A.2d 578
(1975); Commonwealth ex rel. Goodman v. Delara, 219 Pa. Super. Ct. 449, 281 A.2d 751
(1971).
The remainder of this comment will examine the specific factors
considered by the court. Since the main purpose of the support order is to
"determine a reasonable allowance" for the child, the most logical factor
to start the discussion is the child's needs.
III. Needs of the Child
In Commonwealth ex rel. Lippincott v. Lippincott25 the court de-
fined the needs of the child as "the basic necessities: food, shelter,
clothing, that which the parent is charged to provide by the state, educa-
tion, and those things which are necessary to maintain the station in life to
which the children have been accustomed." 26 The latter part of this
definition distinguishes the support definition of "needs" from the legal
concept of necessaries. Necessaries are the minimum requirements of the
child such as food, shelter and clothing, while the term "needs" in-
cludes, in addition, the extra benefits the parents can afford and those that
have become a way of life for the children.
One reason for an award exceeding the cost of mere necessities is the
desire to maintain the child in the financial position that he occupied
before the parents' separation.27 Another reason is that if the child loses
present obtainable advantages they may be lost forever. a8 Furthermore, it
is reasonable to require a parent to support his child in a reasonable
manner, on a par with the life style the parent enjoys.
Two methods have been used to transform the child's needs to a
specific dollar figure. The first emphasizes the past life style of the child
while the second looks to future estimated costs.
A. Past Life Style as a Gauge for the Future
The consideration given to past life style in defining the needs of the
child has varied. Some judges will stress this factor almost exclusively,
while others discount it. 29 It is most often taken into account in cases in
which there is an affluent non-custodial parent who insists that parental
responsibility should be limited to providing basic necessities. The pre-
vailing rule is that an affluent father has a legal duty to give his children
25. 93 Montg. 6 (Pa. C.P. 1970).
26. Id. at 8.
27. Florida considers this an important objective. For a thorough discussion of Flori-
da child support calculation, see Stone & White, A Study of Alimony and Child Support
Rulings with Some Recommendations, 10 FAM. L.Q. 75 (1976).
28. Commonwealth ex rel. Gitman v. Gitman, 428 Pa. 387, 237 A.2d 181 (1967).
29. One common pleas judge reasoned that it is the standard of living to which a
family becomes accustomed that governs the calculation of a proper support order, consis-
tent, of course, with the parent's income and assets. Commonwealth ex rel. Dunkelberger v.
Dunkelberger, 96 Dauph. 357 (Pa. C.P. 1974). Practically all judges will give some consider-
ation to the past life style of the parties. See, e.g., Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d
324 (1974); Commonwealth ex rel. Kaplan v. Kaplan, 236 Pa. Super. Ct. 26, 344 A.2d 578
(1975).
the advantage that his financial status indicates to be reasonable.30 Justice
Musmanno, in Commonwealth ex rel. Gitman v. Gitman, 31 graphically
articulated this rule:
If the husband-father can afford for himself a caviar-
champagne standard of living, it is not justice, nor legal, that
the wife should be content with a tent and bread-and-butter
menu for herself and brood.3 2
An argument can be made that consideration of the past life styles of
the parties involved is harmful to the interests of children from low-
income families. Certainly the basic needs of a child from a poor back-
ground are the same, or very similar to, those of the child from an affluent
background. The past life style of the low income child was most likely
very simple and a court may be satisfied if the support award covers only
the barest necessities, since this is all the child has ever received. If past
life styles were ignored, the low-income child and the high-income child
would begin on an equal plain with a standard need allowance that would
be raised or lowered depending on the parent's ability to pay. There is
little question that consideration of past life style will most benefit the
child from wealthy parents. There are limits, of course, to what any child
can reasonably assert as its needs despite an enormous income by the
parent.33 It remains in the discretion of the judge to set a reasonable
award.
Past life style can be a very useful method of determining the needs
of the child if properly applied. The record of past life style will be a good
indication of the manner in which the child would have been supported
had the parents remained together, and will act, subject to other attenuat-
ing factors, as a fair starting point for support calculations.
B. Future Expenditures as a Means of Calculation
A second method courts will employ in determining the financial
needs of the child involves the itemization of future expenditures. In
Commonwealth ex rel. Hauptfuhrer v. Hauptfuhrer3 4 the court pointed
30. Commonwealth v. Wiener, 32 Leh. 251 (Pa. C.P. 1966); accord, Hecht v. Hecht,
189 Pa. Super. Ct. 276, 150 A.2d 139 (1959). In Hecht the Pennsylvania Superior Court listed
some advantages that children of wealthy parents should receive. The list of reasonable
needs included travel, private lessons in music, drama, swimming, horseback riding and
other activities in which the child shows interest and ability, as well as the best medical care,
good clothes, a familiarity with good restaurants, good hotels, good shows and good camps.
Id. at 283, 150 A.2d at 143. Likewise, private schooling has often been deemed a reasonable
need, particularly when the parents have provided this type of schooling for the child all his
life. Commonwealth ex rel. Lippincott v. Lippincot, 93 Montg. 6 (Pa. C.P. 1970). Accord,
Commonwealth v. Wiener, 32 Leh. 251 (Pa. C.P. 1966). See Gillespie v. Gillespie, 47 Wes.
101, 37 Pa. D. & C.2d 47 (1965) (pre-preparatory school).
31. 428 Pa. 387, 237 A.2d 181 (1967).
32. Id. at 394, 237 A.2d at 185.
33. Commonwealth ex rel. Hauptfuhrer v. Hauptfuhrer, 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 301, 310
A.2d 672 (1973) ($800 per week too high even though father had estate worth over $500,000).
34. Id. The custodial wife had submitted a list of future expenditures exceeding $800
per week. The court rejected this and accepted the father's figure of $600 per week,
out the deficiencies of this analysis, namely that the list of expenditures
will often by inflated and include duplicate costs. The fact that the figures
represent future expenses will make their reliability suspect. Also the
figures are submitted by the parent who is requesting support money and
who has every reason to maximize the estimates and include the same
expense in several categories. The past life style method will yield a more
reasonable figure since it can readily be substantiated from the past
records of the parents and will produce a more accurate picture of just
how this family does manage. Future estimated expenditures, however,
should not be ignored, particularly when it is sufficiently proven that they
will be incurred.
One shortcoming remains in both the past record and future listing
methods of need determination. Regardless of method used, Pennsyl-
vania courts have not made provision for increasing the amount of the
award to account for cost of living increases or changes in the age and
needs of the child. It is generally more costly to support a high school
teenager than a young child. Courts have accepted this reasoning, 35 yet
will still require the custodial parent to go back to court a second and third
time to seek an increase. This is a costly and time consuming process for
all parties concerned, including the court. Automatic escalator clauses
would alleviate this problem but could give rise to due process problems
if no hearing is granted to the non-custodial parent. 36 The courts may
have to develop a mathematical model37 into which they could plug
figures to produce an award accurately reflecting cost of living increases
to make the use of escalator clauses feasible.
In determining the child's needs, it is rarely possible to separate
precisely the expenses attributable to the child from those attributable to
the custodial parent. For example, it is very difficult to apportion rent or
food expense. It is reasonable that all legitimate expenses of the child, but
not those of the custodial parent, be shared by the non-custodial parent.
For example, if the custodial parent must pay sixty dollars more each
month for a two-bedroom apartment than for a one-bedroom one, the
non-custodial parent should be required to pay one-half of the extra
expense. This type of analysis will help balance the support burden and
approximately the amount he had been contributing in the past when the family was
together.
35. Several courts have recognized that it is more expensive to feed, clothe and
educate a child as it grows older. Hecht v. Hecht, 189 Pa. Super. Ct. 276, 150 A.2d 139
(1959); Commonwealth ex rel. Dunkelberger v. Dunkelberger, 96 Dauph. 357 (Pa. C.P.
1974).
36. A Michigan appeals court in Stanaway v. Stanaway, 70 Mich. App. 294, 245
N.W.2d 723 (1976), struck down an automatic escalator clause because it abrogated the
statutory requirement for modification of support by petition and focused exclusively on the
circumstances of the paying parent while totally ignoring the factors relating to the child's
benefit. The clause provided for 6% of adjusted gross income but never less than $165 per
month. These same dangers may exist in Pennsylvania, but careful drafting might avoid
them.
37. See notes 148-51 and accompanying text infra.
will guard against the injection of alimony concepts into the support
determination. 
38
C. Special Considerations in the Needs Determination
1. Extraordinary Needs of the Child.-Often a child will have
special needs caused by physical inflictions. The non-custodial parent
should be required to contribute toward these needs because they are
often in the realm of necessities and the resultant benefit to the child
greatly outweighs any additional burden placed upon the parent. Since
medical expenses are a legal necessary for which a parent will be liable
even in the absence of a support order, courts are inclined to include
charges for orthodontistry 39 and other special therapy4 in the award. 4'
The lone exception to this general rule is that future indeterminate
expenses will not become part of the award. 42 For example, in Common-
wealth ex rel. Pagel v. Page 43 the mother testified that her child would
need hernia, heart, and facial operations as well as a tonsillectomy but
was not able to testify as to their cost. The court refused to include these
expenses in the award until they were incurred, or at least until the
operations were ordered by doctors. Recurring expenses for orthopedic
shoes, trusses, and medicine were included, however."4
If extraordinary needs are considered reasonable and non-
speculative they will usually be taken into account. Because of the lack of
litigation in this area, however, it is as yet undetermined whether a court
would order a parent to pay for specialized training to develop a child's
unique skill or to compensate for a physical handicap. The inclusion of
these expenses would be consistent with the philosophy that the court is to
act with the best welfare of the child in mind. Certainly such training will
aid a child's complete development.
2. The Adult Child.-A presumption exists in Pennsylvania that
an adult45 child will not require the support of his parents.46 This can be
38. See notes 106-26 and accompanying text infra.
39. See, e.g., Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974) (court awarded $250
per month plus $50 a month in orthodontist fees); Commonwealth ex rel. Halderman v.
Halderman, 230 Pa. Super. Ct. 125, 326 A.2d 908 (1974) (award of $40 per week plus $1400
balance due for orthodontist's services).
40. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hoerner, 168 Pa. Super. Ct. 411,77 A.2d 641 (1951)
(court ordered a generous award for a child who was mentally retarded and needed special
and frequent medical care along with speech lessons).
41. Commonwealth ex rel. Warner v. Warner, 198 Pa. Super. Ct. 124, 181 A.2d 888
(1962) (court is only ordering what law requires). For a suggestion that a parent should be
required to furnish medical insurance for the child, see Goodman, Oberman & Wheat,
Rights and Obligations of Child Support, 7 Sw. U.L. REv. 36 (1975).
42. Commonwealth ex rel. Pagel v. Pagel, 175 Pa. Super. Ct. 32, 100 A.2d 117 (1953).
Contra, Commonwealth ex rel. Warner v. Warner, 198 Pa. Super. Ct. 124, 181 A.2d 888
(1962) (father ordered to pay future medical expenses).
43. 175 Pa. Super. Ct. 32, 100 A.2d 117 (1953).
44. Id.
45. See note 10 supra.
46. Commonwealth ex rel. O'Malley v. O'Malley, 105 Pa. Super. Ct. 232, 161 A. 883
(1932). Accord, Colantoni v. Colantoni, 220 Pa. Super. Ct. 46, 281 A.2d 662 (1971).
overcome by proving that the adult child is incapable of self support
because of a mental or physical infirmity.47 The burden is on the adult
child to refute the presumption.
48
The major controversy in this area concerns the adult child who
attends college.49 The case law on this issue is unsettled, partly because
the age of majority has recently been lowered with the result that most
college students are now legally considered adults. 50 Generally parents
have no duty to provide college education for their child, no matter how
deserving, willing, or able the child may be. If, however, the parent has a
sufficient estate, earning capacity, or income to enable him to pay for his
child's education without undue hardship 51 courts will usually include
college expenses as an element of the support award.5 2 This may be true
even though the child is capable of supporting himself.5 3 The inclusion of
college expenses is apparently motivated by the belief that a college
education is desirable and almost a necessity by today's standards. 54 This
philosophy is coming under fire, however, from judges who realize that a
college education does not guarantee employment and that the child's
time might better be spent in other endeavors.55 Considering that the child
will most likely have achieved majority status by the time he enters
college, the eighteen years during which he has already received support,
the availability of college financial aid and part-time jobs, 56 and the
overcrowded job market for college graduates, support for the college
student may have a dim future.
Although reaching the age of majority will not automatically termi-
47. Commonwealth ex rel. O'Malley v. O'Malley, 105 Pa. Super. Ct. 232, 161 A. 883
(1932) (child too mentally and physically feeble).
48. Colantoni v. Colantoni, 220 Pa. Super. Ct. 46, 281 A.2d 662 (1971) (showing that
child is in medical school will not meet burden).
49. For a thorough analysis of the problem, see Comment, The Duty of a Father
Under Pennsylvania Law to Support His Child in College, 18 VILL. L. REV. 243 (1972).
50. For a discussion of problems it has engendered, see Comment, The Effect of the
Change in the Age of Majority on Prior Divorce Decrees Providing for Child Support, 8
AKRON L. REV. 338 (1975).
51. Emrick v. Emrick, 445 Pa. 428,284A.2d682 (1971); Commonwealth exrel. Welsh
v. Welsh, 222 Pa. Super. Ct. 585, 296 A.2d 891 (1972).
52. See Commonwealth ex rel. Schmidt v. Schmidt, 223 Pa. Super. Ct. 26, 296 A.2d
855 (1972) (father took home $168 per week and had to pay $27 per week for his adult student
child). The child must show he is willing and able to do college work to receive college
support, but this test is easily met. Commonwealth ex rel. Colligan v. Kass, 225 Pa. Super.
Ct. 299, 303 A.2d 225 (1973).
A New York court, to decrease the financial burden on the non-custodial parent,
limited the award for college expenses to the amount required for a child attending a state
university even though the child was attending a more expensive private college. Zucker-
berg v. Zuckerberg, [19761 2 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2472.
53. Commonwealth ex rel. Schmidt v. Schmidt, 223 Pa. Super. Ct. 26, 296 A.2d 855
(1972); see Commonwealth exrel. Hanerkam v. Hanerkam, 221 Pa. Super. Ct. 182, 289A 2d
742 (1972).
54. L. LEVIN, R. LEVIN & R. LEVIN, SUMMARY OF PENNSYLVANIA JURISPRUDENCE,
DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 287.1, at 129 (Supp. 1976).
55. See Commonwealth v. McFeaters, 54 Wash. 141 (Pa. C.P. 1974).
56. But see Commonwealth ex rel. Hanerkam v. Hanerkam, 221 Pa. Super. Ct. 182,
289 A,2d 742 (1972) (potential aid does not negate parent's duty to support).
nate the parent's duty to support, 7 the emancipation of the child, even a
minor, by marriage will extinguish the obligation.58 The rationale for this
rule is that the child's obligation to his spouse and children, if any, takes
precedence over his duty to labor for his parents, which is often thought
to be one of the bases of child support. The marriage of the child thus
severs off both the child's obligations to the parents and those of the
parents to the child.5 9 Public policy might dictate an exception to this
absolute rule, though the issue has not been adjudicated. A child who is
too physically feeble to support himself should not lose his parental
support because of marriage. The parental duty in this instance does not
stem from the parent's right to the labors of the child, but exists because
the child is unable to provide for himself. There is no reason for the
support to end unless it would cause the parents undue hardship.
IV. Earnings of Parent-Ability to Pay Versus Living Expenses
A. What Constitutes Income in a Support Determination?
Once the needs of the child are calculated, it is necessary to deter-
mine the parents' ability to meet those needs. This requires a determina-
tion of each parent's income. Calculation of income for tax purposes is
only a guide and is not binding.' Courts prefer to start with the parent's
salary and then add any supplemental sources of income. The parent will
not be permitted to deflate his available income by subtracting rent,
personal living expenses, 61 repayment of loans from which stock was
purchased, or insurance premiums.
62
Insurance policies owned by the parent are considered to be his
assets and, therefore, a source of income. Even if the child is the
beneficiary, this does not change, because the policies do not meet the
child's immediate support needs.6 3 Any gifts the parent receives from an
57. Several states do not allow support for an adult child under any circumstances.
See, e.g., Schmitz v. Schmitz. 70 Wis. 2d 882, 236 N.W.2d 657 (1975). This may be too harsh
a rule unless the state is willing to provide more educational aid. For a national survey of
cases on this subject, see Annot., I A.L.R.2d 910 (1948).
58. Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 12 Adams 33, 20 Pa. Fiduc. 540 (1970).
59. Commonwealth v. Moore, 34 Northumb. 7 (Pa. C.P. 1962).
60. Sperry v. Sperry, 29 Som. 228 (Pa. C.P. 1974). Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Kallen
v. Kallen, 202 Pa. Super. Ct. 500, 198 A.2d 331 (1964) (effect of income tax after the award
was a proper consideration); Hecht v. Hecht, 189 Pa. Super. Ct. 276, 150 A.2d 139 (1959)
(father got deductions for children so award was adjusted accordingly).
61. Commonwealth ex rel. Williams v. Williams, 106 Pa. Super. Ct. 415, 162 A. 327
(1932).
Lehigh County publishes a schedule of support payments based upon net income and
the number of dependents. Net income is defined as income after normal deductions such as
federal income tax, F.I.C.A., state income tax, city wage tax, hospitalization, life insur-
ance, union dues, and retirement fund contributions. LEHIGH COUNTY, FAMILY SUPPORT
GUIDELINES (1976). See note 103 infra.
62. Commonwealth ex rel. Williams v. Williams, 106 Pa. Super. Ct. 415, 162 A. 327
(1932). The repayment of loans and insurance premiums is thought to increase the parent's
net worth, not decrease it. Commonwealth ex rel. Gitman v. Gitman, 428 Pa. 387, 237 A.2d
181 (1967) (Jones, dissenting).
63. Id. Contra, Commonwealth ex rel. Haimowitz v. Haimowitz, 221 Pa. Super. Ct.
364, 292 A.2d 502 (1972).
outside source such as a relative will also be considered as raising his
available support monies. 6' Courts have been willing to go to great
lengths 65 and make a diligent search for means by which a parent can
raise an adequate support payment. They will investigate a parent's stock
interest 66 and will even compute a normal return on any of the parent's
investments .67
1. Earning Power as a Function of Income.-The parent's earning
power is determined by his cash flow, property, and resources. 68 The
rationale for considering earning power in support determinations is that
the parent should not be able to disguise his true worth and then claim
inability to support his child. This is a meritorious doctrine, but it can be
carried to extreme as it was in Hecht v. Hecht.69 The court reasoned that
because the father owned a $20,000 home for his new wife and himself,
he could afford to pay $100 a week in child support even though his net
weekly income was only $225. This reasoning conflicts with the belief
that the order should not punish the father by causing him to divide his
estate, which is what the father in this situation would have to do. This
was not a case of a parent trying to hide his sources of income or
purposely depleting his resources in order to avoid support. Without
either of these circumstances, the rationale for considering earning power
is lost.
The most frequent situation in which earning power is considered
occurs when a parent is in control of a closely held corporation that can
easily be used to conceal income. Courts have consistently and carefully
scrutinized the finances of this type of corporation 70 to determine what
portion of the parent's expenses it is absorbing. 71 Depreciation expenses
will be added back to his income in some cases72 on the theory that
depreciation does not reduce dollar income. The parent will not be
allowed to deduct his rent expense from his available income when that
rent is paid to a corporation owned solely by him.73 Earning power is a
proper indicator of true income. The court needs an accurate picture of
64. Commonwealth ex rel. Betz v. Betz, 127 Pa. Super. Ct. 98, 193 A. 338 (1937)
(support father received from his own mother allowed him to live luxuriously).
65. See Commonwealth ex rel. Manos v. Manos, 61 Del. 295 (Pa. C.P. 1973), in which
support payments were granted out of the father's state lottery winnings.
66. Commonwealth ex rel. Gitman v. Gitman, 428 Pa. 387, 237 A.2d 181 (1967).
67. Hecht v. Hecht, 189 Pa. Super. Ct. 276, 150 A.2d 139 (1959).
68. Commonwealth ex rel. Dunkelberger v. Dunkelberger, 96 Dauph. 357 (Pa. C.P.
1974).
69. 189 Pa. Super. Ct. 276, 150 A.2d 139 (1959).
70. See Commonwealth ex rel. Gitman v. Gitman, 428 Pa. 387, 237 A.2d 181 (1967)
(Jones, J., dissenting).
71. Id. In Smith v. Smith, 52 Wash. 19 (Pa. C.P. 1970), the court ruled that the
expense account of a non-executive employee did not increase his standard of living,
contrasting this to the sole proprietor.
72. See Commonwealth ex rel. Goichman v. Goichman, 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 311, 316
A.2d 653 (1973); Sperry v. Sperry, 29 Som. 228 (Pa. C.P. 1974) (extent depreciation is
available for support depends on circumstances).
73. Commonwealth v. Wiener, 32 Leh. 251 (Pa. C.P. 1966).
the ability of the parent to support his child. By applying personal
expenses to the corporation, the parent would be enabled to live luxuri-
ously before spending any of his taxable income.
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A court will not look kindly upon a parent who falsely shows a
deflated income. Judicial displeasure was displayed in Commonwealth ex
rel. Betz v. Betz75 when the father, an attorney, deducted from his
business income transportation expenses incurred while using his
mother's car as well as office expenditures. The court responded by
adding these expenses back onto his income. Similarly, in Common-
wealth ex rel. Wills v. Bonetti,76 the court maintained that a parent
cannot escape liability for support by concentrating his resources on the
revival of a defunct business. This, in the court's opinion, evidenced bad
faith. Only necessary business expenditures can be deducted from in-
come, not mere conveniences.7 7 One court has even gone so far as to
suggest that support obligations be given priority over genuine business
needs if the business would not be significantly harmed.
78
After the court has considered every conceivable asset and source of
income of the parent, the next logical step is to see if he could be earning
more.
2. Consideration of Earning Capacity.-When it is evident that a
parent could be making more money, and there is no compelling explana-
tion for the discrepancy, courts will not confine themselves to a consider-
ation of actual earnings79 but will take into account the parent's earning
capacity. This factor usually will not be considered unless there is a
showing of bad faith on the part of the parent8° similar to that of the parent
who tries to disguise his income in the form of assets. The rationale for
this doctrine is that a parent has a duty to provide the children with the
best living he can, although one commentator feels this duty should
extend only to providing a reasonable standard of living.
8 1
Although valid in principle, this analysis may lead to harsh results if
improperly applied. Generally the courts have tried to treat all parties
fairly. For example, a parent is not allowed to resign his position volun-
tarily and then claim poverty, 82 even if the reason for the resignation is to
74. See Commonwealth ex rel. Goichman v. Goichman, 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 311, 316
A.2d 653 (1973).
75. 127 Pa. Super. Ct. 98, 193 A. 338 (1937).
76. 190 Pa. Super. Ct. 335, 154 A.2d 404 (1959).
77. Id.; Commonwealth ex rel. Betz v. Betz, 127 Pa. Super. Ct. 98, 193 A. 338 (1937).
78. Sperry v. Sperry, 29 Som. 228 (Pa. C.P. 1974).
79. Dunkelberger v. Dunkelberger, 96 Dauph. 357 (Pa. C.P. 1974); Sperry v. Sperry,
29 Som. 228 (Pa. C.P. 1974).
80. Commonwealth exrel. Kane v. Kane, 199 Pa. Super. Ct. 489, 185 A.2d 669 (1962).
81. Giacalone, Guidelines for Child Support After Voluntary Reduction of Income,
[1976] 2 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4061.
82. Commonwealth exrel. Haley v. Haley, 199 Pa. Super. Ct. 235, 184 A.2d 155 (1962)
(father responsible to extent of earning capacity).
obtain further education.83 It has also been ruled, however, that a father is
not prohibited from leaving the employ of another to go into business for
himself even if this results in immediate financial sacrifices for all
parties. 84 In Commonwealth v. Trimble85 it was determined that a parent
who had been a construction worker but was now receiving unemploy-
ment compensation had a net earning capacity of $7,000 per year. After
further determining that the parent had not made a good faith effort to
seek employment, the court ordered him to pay $90 per week for the
support of his separated wife and five children. 86 Conversely, this doc-
trine was applied harshly in Commonwealth ex rel. Kaplan v. Kaplan87 to
a custodial mother who was a secretary capable of working in a high-
paying, center-city office at $150 per week but who had accepted a $90
per week suburban job. The court refused to consider her dislike of the
city as a valid reason for her low income and, therefore, reduced the
amount of the father's support payments. This worked a hardship upon
the child because of a collateral issue. The court was overly concerned
with equitably dividing the support burden and placed the interests of the
father over the welfare of the child.
88
Although the earning capacity analysis may entail an onerous re-
straint on the parent's freedom to choose a profession, it is a necessary
evil, particularly since a parent must relinquish a part of his freedom from
responsibility when he brings a child into the world. There are, however,
those who believe that the parent should be able to reduce his support
payments when a change of jobs results in a decrease in salary but an
increase in job satisfaction, but only if the child is left with a reasonably
comfortable life. 89 This compromise, which ensures that neither the
parent nor the child will suffer unduly, is being accepted in Pennsyl-
vania.
90
If the decrease in the parent's income is involuntary, neither earning
capacity91 nor past earnings will be considered. 92 A contrary holding
83. Commonwealth ex rel. Snively v. Snively, 206 Pa. Super. Ct. 278, 212 A.2d 905
(1965).
84. Weiser v. Weiser, 238 Pa. Super. Ct. 488, 362 A.2d 287 (1976).
85. 197 Pa. Super. Ct. 644, 180 A.2d 92 (1962).
86. Id.
87. 236 Pa. Super. Ct. 26, 344 A.2d 578 (1975).
88. A better solution may have been to follow the reasoning of the California court in
In re Lungstrom's Marriage, 43 Cal. App. 3d 848, 118 Cal. Rptr. 202 (1974), in which
attorney's fees and costs were charged to the non-custodial parent to protect and ad-
vance the child's interest. The court reasoned that the child would be benefited if its
custodial parent were relieved of these expenses, leaving more money for the family unit.
Applying this to Kaplan, the court might reason that despite the mother's refusal to work in
a higher paying office, the best interests of the child demand that the father continue his
prior payments unless it would work an undue hardship on him.
89. See Giacalone, Guidelines for Child Support After Voluntary Reduction of In-
come, [1976] 2 FAM L. REP. (BNA) 4061.
90. See Weiser v. Weiser, 238 Pa. Super. Ct. 488, 362 A.2d 287 (1976); Shaffran v.
Shaffran, 92 Montg. 339 (Pa. C.P.), aff'd, 217 Pa. Super. Ct 856, 270 A.2d 251 (1970).
91. Costello v. LeNoir, 462 Pa. 36, 337 A.2d 866 (1975). In this case the father had
previously earned between $8,000 and $20,000 per year. He had recently lost his job because
would violate the basic tenet that support orders are not intended to
punish the parent. A parent who is laid off or injured and unable to find
work should not be ordered to pay an amount that he cannot afford, for
this would further add to his difficulties and might cause him to flee the
jurisdiction, leaving the child without support.
93
B. Living Expenses of the Parents, Including Second Families,
as a Reduction of the Award
After the court has fully considered what the exact amount of the
parent's income is, or should be, and has determined the needs of the
child, it must consider whether the available income minus the amount of
support will leave a satisfactory sum for the parent. Some courts will
subtract the parent's living expenses from his income prior to making a
support award. 94 Whatever mathematical procedure is used, the result
must be to leave the non-custodial parent with a reasonable allowance for
living expenses95 while providing the child with its legal necessaries.
96
Parental expenses that are usually, although not necessarily, 97 taken into
account include the cost of food, housing, medical and dental care,
transportation, clothing, insurance, taxes, and debts. The non-custodial
parent can minimize the support award by using ingenuity in calculating
and proving the amount of his living expenses.
98
of an accident and was currently receiving public assistance payments of $149 per month. In
this situation the court determined that past earnings had no bearing on present income or
ability to support.
92. See id. (parent's ability to support his children to be determined as of the time that
support payments are sought).
93. To facilitate interstate enforcement of support orders Pennsylvania has adopted
the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, §§
2043-1 to 2043-42 (Purdon Supp. 1976-77).
94. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Buonocore v. Buonocore, 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 66,
340 A.2d 579 (1975).
95. Commonwealth ex rel. Goichman v. Goichman, 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 311, 316 A.2d
653 (1973).
96. See Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974).
97. See Commonwealth ex reL. Gitman v. Gitman, 428 Pa. 387, 237 A.2d 181 (1967)
(payment of debt increases net worth).
98. See Sperry v. Sperry, 29 Som. 228 (Pa. C.P. 1974). The court considered the fact
that one parent lived in the family's home while the other had to rent an apartment, and
adjusted the award accordingly.
One New York court included in the father's living expenses the $400 per month that it
cost him to fly his two children to his home in New York from Florida, where they lived with
their mother. Sandra B. v. Charles B., 85 Misc. 2d 633, 380 N.Y.S.2d 861 (1976). The court
chose to subtract the $400 plane expense from the $750 per month award because the
mother, who had been granted custody in New York, had taken the children to Florida
without good reason, thereby depriving the father of visitation rights. While the court
professed to consider the interests of the children in their father's companionship and
guidance, the children were deprived of financial support because of an act by one parent
against the other. The court's motive may have been a desire to punish the mother, an idea
alien to child support. This decision was also unusual in that it subtracted the entire
transportation expense from the support award rather than attributing a portion of it to the
father.
In Pennsylvania support payments may be reduced during the period that the child
spends with the non-custodial parent, but may not be eliminated entirely because certain
custodial expenses are constant. Commonwealth ex rel. O'Hey v. McCurdy, 199 Pa. Super.
Ct. 115, 184 A.2d 291 (1962).
An unresolved complication in the calculation of parental expenses
arises when a divorced parent remarries and takes on additional depen-
dents. Remarriage will not relieve either parent of the duty of support,99
but courts take varying views on whether or not the acquisition of a
second family is a valid reason for reducing support payments. Illinois,
for instance, takes the view that the obligation to support a new family is
secondary to the obligation to support children of a first marriage.'
°
Pennsylvania took a similar stance in Commonwealth ex rel. Pacell v.
Rouse.1 0 The court would not allow the fact that a father had three
children by a second marriage to interfere with its determination that $150
per month was inadequate to support his four children by a previous
marriage.
The courts will not, however, ignore the reality that additional
dependents also deserve support from the parent and will reduce the
available income a parent has to support his first children. In Common-
wealth ex rel. Jennings v. Jennings"°2 the court refused to increase a
support award to make it commensurate with a parent's increased earn-
ings because the parent now had five stepchildren to support by a second
marriage. It may be that the underlying rationale in this case was that the
children were receiving adequate support and the increase was not cru-
cial. Nevertheless, the court should have taken into account the support
available for the stepchildren from the natural non-custodial parent. The
duty to support one's natural child never ceases despite divorce and
remarriage.
The obligation to support a second family should not be made
secondary to the obligation to support the children of a prior marriage,
absent an equalizing factor such as available support from the natural
non-custodial parent of the second family. The new dependents deserve
the same degree of support as those of the first household. Although the
first children may receive reduced support payments because the parent
voluntarily chose to take on additional burdens, 10 3 any hardship these
99. See Scar's Estate, 313 Pa. 415, 169 A. 776 (1934).
100. Daniels v. Daniels, 38 II1. App. 3d 697, 348 N.E.2d 259 (1976).
101. 214 Pa. Super. Ct. 741, 251 A.2d 808 (1969).
102. 57 Del. 198 (Pa. C.P. 1969).
103. Lehigh County distributes support payment schedules that provide for equal
payment to all dependents of a wage-earning parent. A wife counts as two dependents. Part
of this schedule is reproduced below from LEHIGH COUNTY, FAMILY SUPPORT GUIDELINES
(1976).
Weekly Dependents
Net Income One Two Three Four Five Six or More
$120 $24 $35 $ 50 $ 55 $ 60 $ 60
$180 $36 $54 $ 72 $ 87 $ 93 $ 97
$250 $50 $75 $100 $120 $130 $135
If a father has two children by a first marriage and two by a second marriage, he has six
dependents, including two for his present wife. If his income is $180.00 per week he would
children must suffer is secondary to the need for equal treatment of all
dependents and the right of the parent to remarry. Judicial discretion must
inevitably play a large role in this situation.
Another parental expense issue in the "second family" field may
arise if the parent's new spouse has separate income. Counsel for the
child will want this spouse's additional income considered because it
raises the amount the non-custodial parent will be able to contribute. The
Pennsylvania law on this issue is that if a father remarries, the new wife is
not required to support minor children of the father's first marriage, and
the separate assets or earnings of the second wife should not be consid-
ered as an element of the father's financial resources in computing the
amount of support ordered for his minor children. 1
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It is generally accepted, however, that the second wife's income will
be examined to see what she contributes toward family expenses to
arrive at a true determination of the father's ability to pay support.1
0 5
For instance, if a non-custodial parent claims his rent expense is $200 per
month, the court will examine the family's financial records to see what
portion of that expense the parent's working spouse should be defraying.
Since the parent's share of the living expenses will be considerably less if
he lives with a working spouse than if he lives alone, the court should
rightly take this into account as it would any joint assets of the new couple
that would increase the parent's ability to pay.
Once the income and expenses of each parent have been separately
established and the needs of the child have been determined, the court
must apportion among the parents responsibility to meet those needs.
V. Equalizing the Parental Burden
Pennsylvania child support law has undergone a significant change
over the last few years. Formerly, the father had the primary duty to
support his minor children;"° the income or financial resources of the
mother were treated only as attendant circumstances. 107 The passage of
the equal rights amendment 10 8 to the Pennsylvania Constitution made this
be ordered to pay two-sixths of $97.00 or $32.33 per week to his first two children. If he had
not remarried he would be ordered to pay $54.00 for these same two children. The court,
however, does retain discretion to handle extenuating circumstances. See Whybra v. Gus-
tafson, 2 Mich. App. 516, 140 N.W.2d 760 (1966) (judge should not blindly follow any
support payment schedule in abdication of his duty to exercise judicial discretion).
104. Commonwealth ex rel. Travitzky v. Travitzky, 230 Pa. Super. Ct. 435, 326 A.2d
883 (1974). Accord, Commonwealth ex rel. Marshall v. Ebbert, 212 Pa. Super. Ct. 553, 243
A.2d 143 (1968) (father's legal wife not liable for support of his illegitimate children).
105. Commonwealth ex rel. Travitzky v. Travitzky, 230 Pa. Super. Ct. 435, 326 A.2d
883 (1974). Accord, Commonwealth ex ref. Marshall v. Ebbert, 212 Pa. Super. Ct. 553, 243
A.2d 143 (1968).
106. Commonwealth ex rel. Bortz v. Norris, 184 Pa. Super. Ct. 594, 135 A.2d 771
(1957).
107. Commonwealth ex re. Yeats v. Yeats, 168 Pa. Super. Ct. 550, 79 A.2d 793 (195 1).
108. The new amendment reads:
Prohibition Against Denial or Abridgement of Equality of Rights Because of
rule a vestige of the past.l°9 Support of the children is now the mutual
responsibility of the mother and the father."' Both are required to share
in the support to the extent of their financial capacity and ability,"'I and
both of their incomes must be considered before a support award is
made.' 12
There are few exceptions to this rule. In fact, failure to consider the
mother's income and assets" 3 may constitute reversible error even if the
mother has custody. 114 But equality of obligation does not necessarily
mean equality of monetary contribution by the spouses. 15 Their contribu-
tion may vary according to their respective capacities and abilities to
make provisions for the child." 6
The simplest method of determining their contributions is to apply
strict mathematical analysis. This was done effectively in Commonwealth
ex rel. Buonocore v. Buonocore. I The court accepted all figures given
by the parents as to the amount of their earnings, the amount spent on the
child, and the amount each spent on personal living expenses. It then
ordered the non-custodial mother to pay the father a percentage of the
support that matched her percentage of the parents' total income. Since
there was no question as to the figures used for calculation and no special
problems arose, the simple mathematical analysis was easily applied;
unfortunately, this can rarely be so because of the multitude of complex
considerations that usually enter into a support determination.
Generally, the more one earns, the more one should contribute
toward support. The term "support" need not, however, be perceived as
strictly monetary. As demonstrated in the following section, there may be
certain cases in which the non-custodial parent should contribute the
financial support while the custodial parent provides the home support
and services that go along with this responsibility.
Sex. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of the sex of the individual.
PA. CONST. art. I, § 28. For a complete discussion of the effect of the amendment, see
Comment, The Support Law and the Equal Rights Amendment in Pennsylvania, 77 DICK. L.
REV. 254 (1973).
109. Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974), noted in 10 TULSA L.J. 485
(1975).
110. Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 540, 318 A.2d 324, 326 (1974); Commonwealth ex
rel. Travitzky v. Travitzky, 230 Pa. Super. Ct. 435, 326 A.2d 883 (1974).
111. Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 540, 318 A.2d 324, 326 (1974); Commonwealth ex
rel. Buonocore v. Buonocore, 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 66, 69, 340 A.2d 579, 581 (1975).
112. See Costello v. LeNoir, 462 Pa. 36, 337 A.2d 866 (1975); Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa.
536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974).
113. This analysis was carried one step further in Sperry v. Sperry, 29 Som. 228 (Pa.
C.P. 1974), in which the court postulated that when the father is unable to bear the entire
support burden a custodial non-working mother's potential earning ability should be
considered.
114. Kaper v. Kaper, 227 Pa. Super. Ct. 377, 323 A.2d 222 (1974).
115. Sperry v. Sperry, 29 Som. 228 (Pa. C.P. 1974).
116. Costello v. LeNoir, 462 Pa. 36, 337 A.2d 866 (1975); Sperry v. Sperry, 29 Som. 228
(Pa. C.P. 1974).
117. Commonwealth ex rel. Buonocore v. Buonocore, 62 Del. 198 (Pa. C.P.), aff'd, 235
Pa. Super. Ct. 66, 340 A.2d 579 (1975).
A. Custodial Care as an Equalizer
The equalization of the support burden between custodial and non-
custodial parent is a difficult endeavor because each has unique respon-
sibilities to the child. Custodial care is a need of the child that, unques-
tionably, the custodial parent fulfills to a greater extent than the other
parent. When the custodial parent provides housing, cooks food, washes
clothing, and performs many other mundane services for the child, this to
some extent satisfies the mutual support obligation. 118 The non-custodial
parent will therefore be ordered to make a monetary contribution to
balance the burden. 11
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This analysis works well when the custodial parent is self-
supporting. A more complicated problem arises when a custodial mother
is not working and financial exigencies have not required her to do so. As
the court stated in dictum in White v. White,120 "A mother has a moral,
if not legal right to choose to remain home with minor children and
provide a home with the constant presence of a parental figure."' 121 This
right is conditioned, however, on the father's ability to bear the entire
financial support burden.' 22 Under these circumstances, even if the mother
has an earning capacity and is able to work, she will not be considered as
a potential source of child support. The twenty-four hour custodial ser-
vice that the custodial parent provides may well be worth thousands of
dollars per year. To equalize the burden the non-custodial parent should
be required to make an equal monetary contribution. It is inevitable,
however, that some of this money will be used for the mother's support, a
concept alien to Pennsylvania divorce law. 123 In actuality, the mother
would be the equivalent of a full-time live-in employee and the father
would be her sole means of support.' 24
118. Fall v. Fontenot, 307 So. 2d 779 (La. App. 1975); see Hecht v. Hecht, 189 Pa.
Super. Ct. 276, 150 A.2d 139 (1959). These services have monetary value and if not provided
by the custodial parent would have to be paid for, thereby raising the expenses of the child.
119. See Hecht v. Hecht, 189 Pa. Super. Ct. 276, 150 A.2d 139 (1959). In Hecht the
mother worked while the children were in school.
A Louisiana court has included the reasonable cost of child care for children of a
working custodial mother as a child support expense when the children are pre-school age.
Naughton v. Naughton, 304 So. 2d 679 (La. App. 1974).
120. 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 499, 313 A.2d 776 (1973).
121. Id. n.4. Accord, Sperry v. Sperry, 29 Som. 228 (Pa. C.P. (1974) (the unique right
of the mother to remain home is certain to be questioned under the equal rights amendment).
122. Sperry v. Sperry, 29 Som. 228 (Pa. C.P. 1974).
123. Commonwealth ex rel. Platt v. Platt, 227 Pa. Super. Ct. 423, 425, 323 A.2d 29, 30
(1974).
124. A Maryland court has recently decided that it is reasonable to include expenses for
house payment, home repairs, the family food bill, and transportation costs in a support
order against the father and for the custodial mother and her two children. Part of these
expenses are necessarily the mother's. The court made it clear this was not alimony but was
only child support:
The mere fact that the wife has waived alimony . . . does not take away . ..
from the children the right to be maintained in the manner that they were
maintained prior to the divorce, and of necessity if you've got two young children
and they've got to have a mother's care and [it's] not required that she work,. ..
and the children are going to benefit from her care. An allowance has to be made
B. Child Support or Alimony?
The inclusion of the custodial parent's expenses in a child support
award raises two questions. The first, peculiar to Pennsylvania, is how to
distinguish this type of award from an alimony payment. The only
apparent justification for failing to distinguish between the two is that the
mother's care is essential to the children's welfare and should, therefore,
be subsidized by the non-custodial father. The second question is whether
it is fair to the father to camouflage alimony payments in this manner,
particularly in view of the equal rights amendment in Pennsylvania. The
father should not have to provide extensive support of this type when the
mother is able to work unless the child has severe emotional problems or
otherwise requires full-time parental attention. The availability of child
care services for the working parent further militates against a finding that
the mother has a right to remain home.
Decisions like White 125 and Hecht v. Hecht 126 suggest that Pennsyl-
vania may be close to permitting alimony payments in the guise of child
support. This approach should be rejected. Although the father should be
required to support his children in the style to which they are accustomed,
he should not have to provide for the mother through a child support
order. This would negate the no-alimony rule in Pennsylvania.
Equalizing the parental burden will normally be the last stage the
court goes through in its support calculation. The child's needs, the
income of the parent, and the equalization of the burden will be consid-
ered in all cases. There are two additional and important factors that
occasionally must be examined in fixing the amount of the award: the
child's sources of income and prior agreements between the parents.
VI. Other Possible Considerations
A. The Child's Income
The employability of a minor child is usually not a factor in deter-
mining the parental duty of support. 127 A parent will not be relieved of
this duty even if the child quits school and works to help support the
family because the parent's irresponsibility cannot be allowed to prolong
the interruption of his child's education. 128 The parental duty is virtually
absolute in this respect. 129
within the maintenance and support money to them to take care of someone,
whether it's the natural mother or someone else, to look after them. If that
someone is going to look after them and live in, they're going to have to have
clothing on their back, going to have to have food and going to have to have
lodging. It's as simple as that.
Halle v. Halle, 25 Md. App. 350, 354, 333 A.2d 360, 362 (1975) (quoting from lower court's
colloquy with counsel).
125. 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 499, 313 A.2d 776 (1973).
126. 189 Pa. Super. Ct. 276, 150 A.2d 139 (1959).
127. White v. White, 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 499 n.5, 313 A.2d 776 n.5 (1973). See Common-
wealth v. Trimble, 197 Pa. Super. Ct. 644, 180 A.2d 92 (1962).
128. Commonwealth v. Trimble, 197 Pa. Super. Ct. 644, 180 A.2d 92 (1962).
129. White v. White, 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 499 n.5, 313 A.2d 776 n.5 (1973).
1. The College Child.-One court 130 listed the child's income as a
major consideration in its child support calculation. The child in this case
was a college student, however, and the income of college children is
usually taken into account in reducing a support award.' 3 ' Although it
seems fair to reduce the parental burden in this situation, the decision may
have the effect of discouraging children from finding jobs while in
school. This result would be prevented if courts also considered the
earning capacity of the non-working student. 132 All students receiving
child support would thus have an incentive to help defray their college
expenses.
2. Trust Fund Income.-The fact that a child has independent
sources of support is generally no defense to a support action against a
parent.' 33 Pennsylvania courts have developed three exceptions to this
rule to account for trust funds set up for the child, whether by the parent
or by someone else. Income from the child's trust funds will be consid-
ered if the parent's ability to meet support obligations is minimal, 34 if the
trust fund is set up expressly for the support and education of the children
regardless of the parent's ability to support,' 3 5 or if the child is a college
student. 136 This last situation is an extension of the court's philosophy of
considering all sources of income of the college child. These exceptions
are consistent with the purpose of child support, which is to provide for
the legitimate needs of the child. If the child has means of his own, the
parents should to some degree be relieved of his financial burden. Inde-
pendent responsibility on the part of the children should be encouraged at
any age. A related problem is encountered when a non-parental relative
contributes occasionally to the child's support. The non-custodial parent
will argue that this represents income to the child and should reduce the
support payments. The child support determination should be based,
however, only on resources of those legally responsible for the child's
support. Gratuitous contributions from other sources 137 are not sufficient-
130. Commonwealth ex rel. Iversen v. Hortman, 97 Montg. 400 (Pa. C.P. 1974).
131. See Commonwealth ex rel. Platt v. Platt, 227 Pa. Super. Ct. 423, 323 A.2d 29
(1974); Doelp v. Doelp, 219 Pa. Super. Ct. 420, 281 A.2d 721 (1971); Commonwealth exrel.
Iversen v. Hortman, 97 Montg. 400 (Pa. C.P. 1974).
132. The earning capacity of the adult student child should be his capacity to earn as a
full-time student rather than a full-time laborer.
133. Commonwealth ex rel. Byrne v. Byrne, 212 Pa. Super. Ct. 566, 243 A.2d 196
(1968); Commonwealth ex rel. Polk v. Polk, 12 Adams 161 (Pa. C.P. 1971)._
134. Commonwealth ex rel. Goichman v. Goichman, 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 311, 316 A.2d
653 (1973) (trust fund income both added to parent's income and subtracted from child's
needs. See Commonwealth ex reL. Iversen v. Hortman, 97 Montg. 400 (Pa. C.P. 1974).
135. Doelp v. Doelp, 219 Pa. Super. Ct. 420, 281 A.2d 721 (1971).
136. Commonwealth ex rel. Schlesinger v. Schlesinger, 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 284, 331
A.2d 694 (1974).
137. Carole K. v. Arnold K., 85 Misc. 2d 643, 380 N.Y.S.2d 593 (1976). See Conway v.
Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974); Commonwealth ex rel. Prelec v. Prelec, 179 Pa.
Super. Ct. 422, 115 A.2d 847 (1955).
ly reliable to be considered.' 38 There is no guarantee that they will be
continued in the future.
B. Prior Agreements Between the Parents
Another possible problem area is the effect of former agreements by
the parents. A parent cannot contract away the rights of the minor child to
adequate support from the non-custodial parent, irrespective of the legali-
ty of the agreement as between the parents. 39 Public policy"n° requires
that the support of children not be jeopardized by inter-parental accom-
modation. A contract made by the parents with respect to support pay-
ments is valid and may be considered, 4' but nothing in the contract will
preclude the court from making an independent determination of the
child's needs. 42 A court-ordered award in excess of the amount called for
in the agreement will not affect any other provision of the agreement. 143
Conversely, contractual provisions for support greater than the court
would otherwise have ordered must be honored.
One parent's previous restraint in negotiating for child support does
not relieve a legally responsible parent of the duty to support his child in a
reasonable manner. '4 Even the violation of court custody orders by one
of the parents will not absolve the other from support payments, 145
because support and custody are separate and distinct concerns. 46 The
parent's duty to support the child is absolute. 147 Nothing the other parent
does, whether it be a violation of a former agreement or of a court order,
will relieve that duty.
VII. An Econometric Model
A study of Florida child support cases has led to an innovative
suggestion by one commentator that could be used in Pennsylvania to
remove the calculation of support awards from the discretion of the trial
judge. '48 The study showed a lack of consistency in factor analysis from
138. See Commonwealth ex rel. Prelec v. Prelec, 179 Pa. Super. Ct. 422, 115 A.2d 847
(1955). But see Commonwealth ex rel O'Hey v. McCurdy, 199 Pa. Super. Ct. 115, 184 A.2d
291 (1962) (grandfather's contribution affects social status and mode of living of parties).
139. See, e.g., Mallinger v. Mallinger, 197 Pa. Super. Ct. 34, 175 A.2d 890 (1961); Bupp
v. Bupp, 13 Adams 164 (Pa. C.P. 1972).
140. L. LEVIN, R. LEVIN & R. LEVIN, SUMMARY OF PENNSYLVANIA JURISPRUDENCE,
DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 291, at 216 (1954).
141. A parent should, however, direct the court's attention to prior financial arrange-
ments for support if it is advantageous to do so. A prior agreement may, for example, be a
good indication of the family's past life style.
142. Clark v. Clark, 55 West. 191, 64 Pa. D. & C.2d 286 (1973).
143. Id.
144. Commonwealth ex rel. Prelec v. Prelec, 179 Pa. Super. Ct. 422, 115 A.2d 847
(1955).
145. Commonwealth ex rel. Chila v. Chila, 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 336, 313 A.2d 339 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Mexal, 201 Pa. Super. Ct. 457, 193 A.2d 680 (1963).
146. Commonwealth ex rel. Posnansky v. Posnansky, 210 Pa. Super. Ct. 280, 232 A.2d
73 (1967).
147. Commonwealth v. Mexal, 201 Pa. Super. Ct. 457, 193 A.2d 680 (1963).
148. Stone & White, A Study of Alimony and Child Support Rulings with Some
Recommendations, 10 FAM. L.Q. 75 (1976).
one county to the next. This inconsistency spawned the suggestion that a
team of specialists, including an economist, econometrician, statistician,
psychologist, attorney, clergyman, counselor, and personal finance ex-
pert, develop an econometric model to be used by the state for child
support determinations. 4 9 Such a mathematical model with a predeter-
mined stress on each factor would ensure equitable treatment in every
case, would relieve the judge of his discretionary burden, and would
reduce the number of appeals. 5 ' The only time-consuming process left
would be the verification of the accuracy of the figures plugged into the
formula. 151
The suggestion has merit and deserves further study, but it may
offend those who oppose strictly mechanical determinations. The model
must be flexible enough to account for all conceivable factors, an admit-
tedly difficult task. Because of this it might be advantageous to allow the
judge some discretion in unusual circumstances, but at least there would
be a point of reference from which to work.
VIII. Conclusion
The Pennsylvania system of child support is marked by a lack of
consistency and direction. In this facet of the law, which is based in large
measure on economic and mathematical analyses, tables of statistics and
calculation formulas should be developed to assure equitable treatment of
all parties. In this light the econometric model has much to offer. But, as
noted previously, the subject will require further study before it can gain
full acceptance. The vesting of unbridled discretion in trial court judges
has made and continues to make this an unstructured area of the law. If
judicial discretion is to remain unchecked there should be a consistent
theme running through the consideration of each support factor.
Simple mathematical tables could be used strictly as a reference
point, with emphasis placed upon the child's best interests in evaluating
149. Id. at 83.
150. Id. at 84.
151. The proposed child support model was stated as follows:
X1 = B0 + B2X2 + B 3x3 + B 4x4 + B5x5 + B 6x 6 +B 7x7 + Bgx 8 + Bgxg+ Bloxio.
Beta0 (B0) represents the intercept of the multiple regression equation and Betas 2 through
10 represent the slopes of the dependent variables on the respective independent variables.
In other words, the Betas are used as statistical tools for assigning proper statistical weight
to the inputs needed to determine the amount of the child support payments. The variables
used in the model are as follows:
x, = Child Support Payments
x2 = Estimated Financial Needs of Wife
X3 = Estimated Financial Needs of Husband
X4 = Total Assets
X5 = Total Liabilities
X6 = Number of Dependent Children
x7 = Ages of Dependent Children
xs = Net Income of Husband
xg = Net Income of Wife
x10 = Duration of Marriage
Id. at 78.
the weight to be given each factor. In this way parties coming into court
would have an idea of the basis upon which the decision will be made.
Decisions would be streamlined and made simpler to justify. With the
expanding areas of equalization of the parental and custodial care
expense, courts will need a principle by which to resolve conflicts among
support considerations. The child's best interests, considered effectively
in child custody cases, can fulfill a major part of this need by settling
calculatory impasses in favor of the child rather than pitting parent against
parent.
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